

ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION
DOCKET NOS. 02-0798/03-0008/03-0009 (Consolidated)

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

DAVID CROSS

Submitted On Behalf Of

CENTRAL ILLINOIS PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY,

d/b/a AmerenCIPS,

and

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY,

d/b/a AmerenUE

June 2003

ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION

DOCKET NOS. 02-0798/03-0008/03-0009 (Consolidated)

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF

DAVID CROSS

SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF

CENTRAL ILLINOIS PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY

d/b/a AmerenCIPS

and

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY

d/b/a AmerenUE

Q. Please state your name and business address.

A. My name is David Cross. I am a Principal with Mercer Human Resource Consulting. My business address is 1717 Arch Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.

Q. Are you the same David Cross who filed rebuttal testimony in this proceeding?

A. Yes, I am.

Q. What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony?

A. I am responding to the rebuttal testimony of Illinois Commerce Commission Staff ("ICC Staff") witness Ms. Burma C. Jones.

Q. What is the specific nature of your testimony?

A. One specific area that I am responding to is Ms. Jones' criticism of the use of earnings based measures in the Ameren plan. Ameren uses an earnings per share ("EPS") measure as an initial trigger to determine funding of incentive allocations. She

24 states that the use of such measures primarily benefits shareholders and not customers.
25 My commentary regarding this point is first, as I stated in my earlier testimony,
26 earnings-based measures are the most common measures in annual incentive plans, not
27 only among utilities, but across all industries. Hence, Ameren's use of this measure
28 meets reasonable competitive standards. Second, as I already noted, the earnings
29 component of the plan merely "funds" the opportunity to allocate awards; it does not
30 guarantee payment of the awards. Actual allocation is dependent on performance against
31 Key Performance Indicators such as reducing delivery service cost per customer,
32 increasing customer service satisfaction, and others. In this case, the Key Performance
33 Indicators are clearly customer focused and demonstrate Ameren's commitment to
34 aligning the interests of both customers and shareholders. If customer oriented goals are
35 not met as required by the relevant Key Performance Indicators, there is no incentive
36 compensation. It is these aspects of the Ameren plan that were either overlooked or
37 ignored by Ms. Jones.

38 In summary then, the Illinois Commerce Commission ("Commission")
39 should be cognizant that the use of earnings based measures is common in most utility
40 incentive plans. While the Commission may have been reluctant in the past, in certain
41 instances, to permit recovery of these expenses in rates, the Commission should now
42 understand that this form of employee compensation is the norm and that there is no
43 legitimate basis to treat regulated enterprises differently from their unregulated
44 counterparts. Further, Ameren's use of Key Performance Indicators in the allocation of
45 incentives is entirely consistent with the interests of their customers. The Staff has not
46 recognized the real benefits in terms of cost reductions, efficiency gains, and overall

47 customer satisfaction being realized by Ameren customers as a result of the incentive
48 compensation plan.

49 **Q. Do you have any other responses to Ms. Jones' rebuttal testimony?**

50 **A.** Yes I do. In Ms. Jones' testimony she comments that Ameren's incentive
51 plans are discretionary and may be suspended (or discontinued) at any time. In my view,
52 this assertion is not a reasonable basis upon which to conclude the plan only benefits
53 shareholders, and has no foundation in market reality. To make my point, consider the
54 implications if you took Ms. Jones' suggestion to its logical extreme. Ameren could
55 literally decide that any form or level of compensation should be eliminated or lowered at
56 its discretion. In essence, Ameren could elect to modify an employee's salary or bonus
57 levels at any time it chooses – other than bargained agreements, nothing could stop
58 management from taking such an action. However, this would never happen because
59 taking such an action would create severe strains to employee relations and labor market
60 issues. Trust in management, the effectiveness of the staff and overall morale would be
61 undermined so dramatically that it would make the organization ineffective, and likely
62 cause many (or even most) employees to look elsewhere for employment. The result
63 would be that retaining employees would be virtually impossible if Ameren determined
64 incentives would be made (or withdrawn) on a purely discretionary basis. If management
65 makes a decision to not pay out incentives due to poor performance, then I would not
66 suggest the plans are discretionary, but rather that they are performance based – which is
67 exactly the type of outcome you want from an incentive plan. Alternatively, to suggest
68 that the absence of a payout, in light of poor performance, is discretionary implies Ms.
69 Jones believes the incentives were an entitlement in the first place which is counter to

70 sound compensation theory. Therefore, her assertion in response to my testimony is not
71 reasonable.

72 **Q. Does this conclude your surrebuttal testimony?**

73 **A.** Yes, it does.